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bined with a notable lack of a definite conclusion, could lead to an
interpretation that the case holds delivery removes an oral assignment
from the operation of the statute. Such a proposition, however, would
contravene the letter and purpose of the law,2 6 and ignore the factual
foundation for the instant decision. The Court was fully cognizant
of the statutory intendment,2 and to infer a holding which manifestly
defeats this purpose would do a grave injustice to a court of the
highest reputation.
The principal decision accomplishes substantial justice, but it
does expose the statute to the danger of serious inroads. The case
should be strictly limited and freely distinguished, in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence of fraud, lest the statute be repealed
by judicial fiat.

X
NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT-SECRETARY OF STATE
NOT BOUND TO EFFECT RELEASE OF FOREIGN-JAILED AMERICAN
SolUiER.-Relator petitioned for release of her soldier-husband from
a French jail, alleging violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination. Pursuant to treaty,1 the American soldier had been
sentenced by a French court upon a plea of guilty to a robbery charge.
The Court of Appeals held that under the treaty the Secretary of State
had no duty to negotiate for his freedom. United States ex rel. Keefe
v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct.
440 (1955).
Every citizen who enters the military is deprived of some constitutional protections previously enjoyed. Indictment by grand jury
is a right expressly withheld from members of the armed forces by
the Constitution.2 Historically, other rights, such as trial by jury in
military tribunals, have been judicially denied. 3 This is partially ex26 See Brief for the New York State Ass'n of Life Underwriters as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 5, 6, 15, Katzman v. .Etna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d
307 (1955) ; Superintendent of Insurance's Memorandum to Governor concerning
Assembly Int. No. 473, Prt. 486, p. 1 (1943).
27 See Brief for the New York State Ass'n of Life Underwriters, supra
note 26.
1The treaty entitled "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces" is found in 99 CONG. REC.
9024-29 (daily ed. July 14, 1953). This agreement, which regulates duties and
immunities of troops of one member country stationed within another, is hereinafter referred to as "SOFA" in the interest of brevity.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) (dictum); United States ex rel.
Innes v. Crystal, 131 F.2d 576, 577 n.2 (2d Cir. 1943) (dictum); see Note,
17 ST. JoHx's L. REv. 29 (1942).
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plained by the fact that the military law of the land antedated the
Constitution. 4 The reality of the distinction between military and
civilian rights was demonstrated in the recent case of United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles.5 There, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Article 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which
subjected civilians, who had been honorably discharged from the service, to trial by court-martial. The decision was based primarily
upon the disparity of constitutional protections.

"... . [M]ilitary tri-

bunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal
courts." 6 The question arises as to whether the "due process" clause
of the fifth amendment is applicable to members of the armed forces.
As outlined in United States v. Clay,7 soldiers have certain safeguards,
among them the right to be informed of charges, confrontation by adverse witnesses, 8 cross-examination, presumption of innocence and
protection against self-incrimination. 9 The court stated that, in determining the scope of these protections, civilian cases in the federal
courts should be consulted as guideposts. 10 Recent opinions, alluding
to a serviceman's fundamental constitutional rights, reveal further attempts to equate military with civilian due process." However, the
Supreme Court stated nearly a century ago that ". . . the power of
Congress, in the government of the [armed forces] . . . is not at all

affected by the fifth or any other amendment," 12 and in a later case
indicated that "military law is due process." 18 It was recognized in
the Clay case that the court "need not concern [itself with] .

.

. con-

stitutional concepts." 14 Thus, the rights which exist under the concept of military due process are basically statutory 15 whereas those
4 See Re, The Uniform Code Of Military Jistice, 25 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
155, 159 (1951).
5 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4005 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955).
6 Id. at 4007.
71 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
8 These rights are also guaranteed by Section 9 of Article VII of SOFA.
9 See United States v. Clay, supra note 7 at 77-78. Additional safeguards
afforded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and not specifically provided
for in SOFA, include appeal rights (U.C.M.J. Arts. 66-69) and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (U.C.M.J. Art. 55).
10 See United States v. Clay, supra note 7 at 78.
11 See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) ; United States v. Ferguson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 87, 17 C.M.R. 68, 87 (1954) (concurring opinion);
United States v. Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954); United States
v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 373, 17 C.M.R. 346, 373 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
12
EX parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 138 (1866) (concurring opinion).
13 Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911) (emphasis added).
14 United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.R. 74, 79 (1951).
15 See McNiece & Thornton, Military Law From Pearl Harbor To Korea,
22 FoRDHAm L. REV. 155, 166-68 (1953); Thornton, Military Law, 28 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 128, 143 (1953).
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afforded persons not subject to military law have a constitutional
foundation.
The status of a serviceman's constitutional rights is further complicated by the fact that American soldiers are currently stationed in
foreign lands. The general question of the efficacy of constitutional
protections outside the geographical limits of the United States is not
new. Shortly after the Spanish-American War, the Supreme Court
ruled that fundamental due process guarantees were not applicable to
crimes against laws of another country.16 Thereafter, in Dorr v.
United States,17 the applicability of trial by jury was denied, but the
Court indicated that some rights fundamental to the spirit of the Constitution would be effective beyond the continental United States.
Recently, the United States Court of Claims held that the fifth amendment prohibition against confiscation of private property ' 8 protects
a United States citizen whose property had been taken in Austria by
American occupation forces.' 9 In so concluding, the court rejected
the government's contention that executive agreements between nations could
supersede the constitutional rights of an American
20
citizen.
In international law the jurisdiction of a sovereign nation within
its boundaries is exclusive and no exemptions exist except by consent. 2' It has been vigorously contended that, even in the absence
of agreement, a waiver of sovereignty is presumed in favor of foreign
forces and that the latter may exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over their personnel. 22 Most modern authorities, however, hold that
there is no immunity in the absence of express compacts, 23 particularly in respect to off-duty crimes.2 4
The Status of Forces Agreement, which is in effect in NATO
countries, is unprecedented in that it deals with criminal jurisdiction
over foreign troops stationed locally during peacetime.2 5 This treaty
confers primary jurisdiction upon member nations to punish crimes
26
committed within their boundaries by off-duty foreign soldiers.
See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
1 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
16

1"... [P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
"1 Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
20

Ibid.

Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)
(dictum).
22 See 1 WHARTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 17a (2d ed. 1887) ; King.
JurisdictionOver Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 Am. J. INT'L L. 539, 559
(1942).
23 See Barton, ForeignArmied Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction,
27 BIrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 186, 234 (1950); Re, The NATO Status of Forces
Agreement and Internatiowal Law, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 349, 392 (1955).
24 See LAwRENCE, THE PmscimLEs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 107 (7th ed.
1923); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948).
25 Re, supra note 23, at 351.
26 See 99 CONG. REc. 9025 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
21
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However, minimal procedural safeguards must be accorded the
accused.2 7 The additional protections provided by the Senate through
its reservation to ratification of the treaty require the military to request the "receiving state" to waive jurisdiction if the accused's constitutional rights are threatened. 28 Should such petition be denied,
the State Department must be requested to press for the accused's
release.2 9 It was further provided that a governmental representative
attend the trial to report treaty procedural violations.30 In the instant
case, there was no indication of governmental compliance with this
latter requisite. 3' Relief was denied on the basis of a military repre32
sentative's report that there were no constitutional irregularities,
and upon the Court's determination that the Secretary of State had
no mandatory duty to negotiate.
The instant case is perhaps most noteworthy for this statement
of judicial deference to the executive:
.. [T]he commencement of diplomatic negotiations . . . is completely in the
discretion of the President and the head of the Department of State, who is
his political agent. The Executive is not subject to judicial control or direction
in such matters.33

While it is apparently true that the executive is the sole instrument
of foreign relations, 3 4 it must be noted that judicial abstention from
review has narrowed in scope.3 5 For example, the granting of passId. at 9026.

27
28 Id. at 9080-81 (Sections
2
9Id. at 9080-81 (Section
30 Id. at 9081 (Section 4).
31 The record reveals only

2 and 3).
3).

that a representative of the Staff Judge Advocate
attended the trial to report on constitutional safeguards, whereas Section 4 of
the reservation requires a representative chosen by the Chief of the Diplomatic

Mission to report any non-compliance with treaty provisions. The possibility
of future conflict may be noted in that this section requires that a representative
"will attend the trial of any such person," while Section 9(g) of Article VII
of SOFA determines that the accused is entitled to have a representative
present "when the rules of the court permit."
32 See Department of the Army letter to relator, December 1, 1953, as reported in United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 440 (1955).
33 United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, supra note 32 at 394.
34 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(dictum). Contra, Lfvirr, THE PRESIDENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
OF THE UNITM STATES 43 (1954).
"This assumption is utterly erroneous.
The powers to deal with international affairs are not completely given to the
President alone." Ibid. (emphasis added).
35 See, e.g., Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), re/d
sub nora. Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
818 (1954), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 688 (1953).
In that case the district court
held that termination of a treaty was a judicial question and found that a
treaty was no longer in existence, in spite of the fact that the State Department regarded the treaty as of continuing effect. The reversal was based on
a finding that the facts did not warrant such a determination, and the appellate
court satisfied itself that the treaty was presently valid. But see Re, Judicial
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ports, previously regarded as not subject to review by the judiciary,
was recently critically examined 3 6 and the issuance to a specific individual effectively controlled.3 7 The Constitution provides that "[t] he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .arising under . . .
38 Since this organic authority apparently allows
Treaties .
review of all aspects of agreements such as SOFA,39 the Court could
have ignored the doctrine of judicial deference, if the facts of the
case warranted relief. "Should the weakest branch of government on
its own initiative weaken itself still further at the expense of the clear
rights of citizens under the Constitution?" 40
The instant case gives currency to demands that the Senate reevaluate the effect of its reservation 41 and possibly adopt a procedure
providing for all servicemen to be returned to American military
custody for disciplinary action. 42 Whatever doubts may exist as to
the rights of soldiers under principles of international law and the
Constitution, it was clearly the legislative intent 43 that an American
soldier abroad be constitutionally protected to the same degree as he
would be in the United States. 44 If the doctrine of judicial deference
is applied, any protections are, in substance, illusory. "Nothing is
so dangerous in a democracy as a safeguard which appears to be
adequate but which is really a facade." 45
*.".."

Developments in Sovereign Immunity and Foreign Confiscations, 1 N.Y. LAw
FORUM 160, 181-85, 205 (1955).
36 See Shachtmen v. Dulles, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2665 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1955).
37 See Dulles v. Nathan, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
39 "... [T]he power to determine whether a [treaty] ...exists, i.e., whether

or not it is constitutional, and to interpret it, is a judicial power and rests
solely in the courts with all the safeguards of review and does not lodge in

the ipsi dixit [sic] of the Executive...
at 22.

"' Artukovic

v. Boyle, supra note 35

40 VANDERBILT, THE DOCrRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 139 (1953).

POWERS

AND ITS

41 It is probable that the implications of United States v. Sinigar, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 330, 20 C.M.R. 46 (1955), will give impetus to any inquiry; for

that decision demonstrated that a soldier, summarily jailed for contempt by a
receiving state under the agreement, can be court-martialed upon return to
military jurisdiction for the same illegal act.
42 See 12 N.Y. COUNTY BAR BuLL. 39 (1954).
43 "If ... there is danger that the accused will not be protected because of

the absence or denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United
States, the commanding officer shall request the authorities of the receiving
state to waive jurisdiction. . .

."

99 CONG. REc. 9080 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).

44Although a locally stationed soldier's rights are not constitutionally based,

the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides a framework to effect substantial justice. See McNiece, Freedom and the Law, in CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
172, 204 (Grindel ed. 1955); Re, Uniform Code Of Military Justice, 25 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 155, 187 (1951).
45 Wilkinson, Member of Parliament, as quoted in VANDERBILT, THE DocTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE

(1953).
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